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1. Introduction. The Stand. 
 
There is a compelling idea in the air. Both contemporary philosophers of mind 
and philosophers of language are engaged in developing theories of (mental or 
linguistic) content that are naturalistic. The stand has been taken: semantic 
properties are not part of the primitive ontological furniture of the world. If we 
want to vindicate those properties as real, we will have to show that it is possible 
to unpack them into some other –primitive– set of properties. It is taken for 
granted that there is no alternative way of avoiding circularity in explaining the 
semantic properties of mental or linguistic representations. The following quote 
from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the locus classicus for this trend: 
 
I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue 
they've been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of 
things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps 
appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply 
doesn't go that deep. It's hard to see, in the face of this consideration, how 
one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some 
extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real 
properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe of 
their supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional 
nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else. 
       (Fodor, 1987, p. 97) 
 
 The naturalistic project seems thus to be deeply rooted in the search for a 
non-circular, explanatory account of intentional categories. Although, in 
principle, one should not take naturalism in regard to some realm as committing 
one to any sort of reductive explanation of that realm, in the context of 
contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, naturalism and 
reductionism como easily upon a meeting point. The reason is that explanatory, 
non-circular answers are taken to be reductionist. If this is correct, we would 
have to conclude that naturalism entails reductionism (regarding a theory of 
content) or, even more strongly, that naturalism is constitutively dependent 
upon the defense of a reductionist thesis. In this case, we would have to admit 
that there cannot be a non-reductionist naturalistic theory of content. 
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 The main aim of this paper is to cast some light on the issue of what 
naturalism means regarding a theory of content. It is a matter of a some urgency 
to find out exactly what it takes for a theory of content to be naturalistic. Until we 
do so, we cannot properly evaluate the existing theories (or indeed, develop our 
own). I will center my discussion of this topic on the question of whether 
naturalistic theories of content ought to be reductionist theories. The claim I want 
to defend is that, despite the current trend regarding the relations between 
naturalism and reductionism, the former is not constitutively dependent upon 
the latter. I will argue that, in fact, the strong requirements of a reductionist 
thesis are the very reason the project of naturalization seems to be doomed. 
However, I will try to show that once we have weakened those requirements, 
non-reductionist answers are certainly acceptable, in the sense of being 
informative, non-circular, and above all, explanatory. I propose a safe[r] 
characterization of naturalism that seems to better fit our theoretical views about 
content, and to turn the whole project into a more promising enterprise. 
 
 
2. Reductionist Rhapsody. 
 
The question I would like to address is whether a reductionist thesis can solve 
the problems which those engaged in the naturalization problem want to solve. 
In order to answer that question, we need to understand first of all what kind of 
reductionism is at issue here. 
 A very strong version of reductionism can be construed as follows. We 
say that a language S2 is reducible to a language S1 when we can translate all 
statements in S2 into statements in S1. In order to explain what such translation 
may consist in, let's imagine a simple case in which the constitutive components 
of S1 and S2 –statements, predicates and proper names– can be arranged 
according to the same syntactic rules, i.e., that S1 and S2, are different only in 
regard to their vocabulary. 
 We can then establish some kind of correspondence between expressions 
in S1 and expressions in S2 by using a function ø that assigns, to any basic term A 
of S2, a term of the same syntactic category ø(A) in S1. There is a translation from 
S2 into S1 if and only if, for any basic term A in S2, A –under the interpretation of 
the language S2– is synonymous with ø(A) –under the interpretation of the 
 4 
language S1– (Cfr. Kutschera, F, 1982, pp. 165-179). Dummett's characterization 
of reductionism follows the same line: 
 
Reductionism, properly so called, is the thesis that there exists a 
translation of statements of the given class into those of some other class, 
which I shall call the reductive class. This translation is proposed, not 
merely as preserving truth-value, but as part of an account of the 
meanings of statements of the given class. 
      (Dummett, 1982, p. 66) 
 
 Now, the main problem with this strong version of reductionism is that it 
doesn't fit the picture that naturalist theorists like Fodor have in mind. If the type 
of reductionism involved in the project of naturalizing semantics were of this 
full-fledged kind, we should be looking for a translation scheme (a translation 
function ø) from S2 to S1 such that for any basic term A in S2 (under the 
intentional interpretation of the language S2) there is a term ø(A) in S1 (under the 
physicalist interpretation of S1) such that ø(A) is synonymous with A. However, 
it is clear that no one out there is looking for translation schemes as part of 
naturalization. 
 Maybe then it is just an unfortunate choice of terminology. Maybe what 
naturalization is all about has very little to do with reductionism –properly 
understood– and much more with the defense of what Dummett calls a reductive 
thesis (henceforth, to make it less confusing, weak-reductive thesis), what 
McGinn calls a reduction of truth (cfr. McGinn, 1982, pp. 120-122) and what 
almost everyone calls a supervenience thesis. The task of a weak reductive thesis 
(or a reduction of truth or a supervenience thesis) is to specify what makes a 
sentence of the given class  (S2) true, when it is true: 
 
A [weak] reductive thesis ... claims only that no statement of the given 
class can be true unless some suitable statement or statements of the 
reductive class are true, and, conversely, that the truth of those statements 
of the reductive class guarantees the truth of the corresponding statement 
of the given class. 




 If "reductionism" is then not the proper term to refer to the characteristic 
strategy of the naturalistic enterprise, I should reformulate my question in the 
weak-reductive sense that seems to describe it better. The question would thus 
be whether naturalistic theories are constitutively dependent upon the defense of 
a weak-reductive thesis. 
 
 
3. The Remains of Reductionism. 
 
A weak-reductive thesis involves a reduction of truth of the statements of a given 
class to the truth of the statements of some other (reductive) class. Ernest Nagel's 
model of reduction in Chapter 11 of The Structure of Science (Nagel, 1961) fits 
this weak-reductive picture. Nagel's terms of reduction are not those of 
statements or classes of statements. Following the positivist spirit of his time, the 
account he provides applies to reduction of one science by another –and 
ultimately of all sciences by physics. What Nagel's reduction involves is thus the 
explanation of the laws of a higher-level science by the laws of a lower-level 
science through the deductive application of bridge laws. 
 It might be argued that Nagel's model of reduction in terms of reduction 
of laws seems prima facie to be yet again too strong for the purposes of 
naturalizing semantics. But, regardless of the nomological character of the 
statements in the sciences at issue, there is something in this model that is central 
for the weak-reductionist: explicability. Even a weak-reductionist wants a science 
or a given class of statements be explicable (and causally explicable) in terms of 
some other science or class of statements, and again ultimately explicable by 
physics (See Brooks, 1994). 
 I shall return to this point shortly, but let me say first that if naturalistic 
theories of content are constitutively dependent upon the defense of this kind of 
weak-reductive thesis, those theories will have to provide, for any statement A in 
the class of intentional statements, some other statement (or some family  of 
statements) A' in the class of physical statements such that, for A to be true, it is 
at least sufficient that A' be true (cfr. Dummett, 1976, p. 94). However, even 
under this new formulation, the project of naturalization seems to face a few 
important hurdles. 
 The one I would like to concentrate on has two versions. One is the 
impossibility of specifying (even) sufficient properties (and, a fortiori, necessary 
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and sufficient properties) that would constitute the parameters of individuation 
for the intentional content of a token thought (or token utterance) at the physical 
level. It has been argued that this impossibility is, almost by definition, a 
limitation of conceptual analysis. Work in cognitive science on concepts and 
categories (cfr. Rosch, 1973, 1975, 1978; Smith and Medin, 1981) suggests that 
intentional concepts simply are not constituted in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. This line of argument has been exploited by, e.g., Stich and 
Laurence (Stich and Laurence, 1994) and Tye (Tye, 1992). I will not dwell on it 
here, although it is interesting to note that naturalist-inclined theorists seem to be 
content with the specification of merely sufficient conditions. So, the fact that no 
necessary and sufficient conditions can be found would not be a real problem for 
them. 
 The second version of the hurdle, the one I would like to comment on 
here, has been beautifully formulated by Terence Horgan: 
 
Although a physical supervenience base might always exist for any 
manifestation of aboutness, in general any adequate non-intentional, non-
semantic characterization of the supervenience base might be enormously 
baroque and complex. Perhaps, for instance, the supervenience base for 
the intentional content of a token thought (or token utterance, or token 
inscription) generally involves a good-size chunk of space-time extending 
well beyond the cognizer's own body and well beyond the time at which 
the token thought occurs; perhaps it involves a rather gargantuan number 
of physico-chemical goings-on within that extended spatio-temporal 
region; and perhaps there isn't any simple way to describe, in non-
intentional and non-semantic vocabulary, all the relevant aspects of this 
hugely complex supervenience base. 
      (Horgan, 1994, p. 309) 
 
 Using our favorite terminology: the problem is that even the defense of a 
weak-reductive thesis regarding intentional properties of mental and linguistic 
representations is blocked by the fact it is extremely difficult (read impossible) to 
specify the statements in the reductive class whose truth will guarantee the truth 
of any statement selected from the given class. That being the case, we can't 
expect to be able to pick out precisely those entities/properties that would count 
as the supervenience base for any token thought or token utterance. 
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 Now, let me refine this position a bit. It could be argued that the advocate 
of a weak-reductive thesis doesn't necessarily have to face this problem, that one 
might e.g. give a functional or causal definition –not in the language of physics– 
which would show how physics could entail intentional properties all the same. 
All we need, in other words, is a functional partition of those categories that play 
a role in semantics. Those categories will be thus characterized in terms of their 
functional/causal properties without having to spell out the structural/physical 
properties underlying them. 
 What I would like to stress here is that, although within this kind of weak-
functional-reductive thesis we give up the need for a specification of the 
properties that constitute the supervenience base of token thoughts or token 
utterances, the explanatory spirit of the full-fledged reductionism remains intact. 
What is expected from a naturalization proposal of this kind is an array of causal 
explanations. Even if the reduction to physics is avoided, the explanatory model 
of physics is maintained. The explanations within the weak-reductive model are 
still very much like the explanations in physics and that poses important 
problems for the naturalization project (see below). 
 We don't have to conclude, however, that the project of naturalizing the 
intentional is doomed. I want to suggest that the logical conclusion is that all 
naturalization requires is that one be able to explain how intentional properties 
arose from non-intentional ones. It doesn't require anything stronger, such as 
reducing intentional properties to functionally-defined causally efficacious 
properties. Under this non-reductive interpretation of the constraints for 
naturalism, we need not affirm that all facts which can be described and 
explained with the help of theories involving intentional language, can be 








4. Safe[r] Passage. 
 
One way of unpacking the notion of explanation invoked above is the following. 
We can say that a non-reductive, naturalistic account of intentional properties is 
one that is consistent with current empirical theories regarding cognition, i.e., 
one that is compatible with the knowledge that different empirical theories 
(biology and neuroscience, mainly) have to offer. An account, in order to be 
naturalistic, should not conflict with what we know about how the brain works 
and/or with what we know about the scientific role of biological functions. But 
this is clearly too weak. After all, someone might argue, divine intervention 
probably is consistent, that is, it doesn't conflict with current empirical theories 
regarding cognition and yet it would be quite surprising for a naturalized 
account of any kind of process to include supernatural powers within its 
theoretical apparatus. The claim ought to be stronger. What we need is a type of 
explanation which shows how brains and biological species could do what our 
account of content requires. The claim I want to defend is that what makes a 
theory of content a naturalized theory of content is that the notions invoked in 
the theory capture structural features of the cognizer's intentionality which make 
it behave in ways that fall under a scientific explanation. 
 We have to be careful though about the notion of scientific explanation. A 
scientific explanation doesn't necessarily involve physical descriptions. Even if it 
does, it is simply not true that physics doesn't include quite abstract theoretical 
entities as part of its most basic explanations. In that sense, the version of 
naturalism present in Fodor's quote, as representative of a widespread 
contemporary trend, is based on the misconception that physical descriptions 
include only theory-independent, real objects and properties. It is interesting to 
notice in connection with this point that what seem to be powerful 
counterexamples to the idea that good explanations are always causal 
explanations are taken frequently from quantum mechanics (see Salmon, 1984). 
But even if those cases could not be regarded as successful counterexamples (I 
must admit that my knowledge of quantum mechanics is too naïve to be a good 
critic here), there is a more important misconception about scientific explanations 
that I'd like to stress. This misconception is to take causal explanations, i.e., the 
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kind of explanation commonly associated with physical explanations, as the only 
model of explanation. Yet there seem to be good reasons to believe that causation 
is just a particular kind –very important but not unique– of determinative 
relation. I think G. MacDonald is right when he claims: 
 
Some of the problems which have been thought to plague attempts to 
naturalize the mental ... arise out of a prejudice which restricts the proper 
form of scientific explanation to causal explanation. 
 
     (G. MacDonald, 1992, pp. 242-243) 
 
 Think of what Kim calls Cambridge dependency (cfr. Kim, 1974). Socrates 
dies and, in virtue of this, Xantippe becomes a widow. Socrates' death and 
Xantippe's new marital status are not the same event. The first difficulty with a 
causal account of the relation between these two events is that they are 
simultaneous. Also, the relation doesn't seem to instantiate any nomic regularity, 
that is, there doesn't seem to be any empirical law that could support a causal 
relation between Socrates' death and the widowing of Xantippe. What we have 
here is some kind of logical entailment, not a physicalist or causal connection: 
"Thus, one might say that the proposition that the death of Socrates occurred at t, 
taken in conjunction with the standing condition that Socrates was the husband 
of Xantippe at t, entails the proposition that the onset of Xantippe's widowhood 
occurred at t" (Kim, 1974, p. 43). 
 I said "some kind of logical entailment" because the two events are not 
symmetrically related, as they would be if we took the logical entailment at face 
value, i.e., if we took the relation to be that of a biconditional. Xantippe's 
widowhood depends on Socrates' death, but not the other way around. This 
asymmetric dependency can be better appreciated if we realize that while it 
seems intuitively true that 
 




the relation expressed by 
 
If Xantippe had not become a widow at t, Socrates would not have died at 
t 
 
seems to reflect an alteration in Socrates' marital status instead of the relation we 
want to capture (See Kim, 1974, p. 43). That relation –the one between Socrates' 
death and the widowing of Xantippe– is an explanatory one, but not a causal-
explanatory relation. Although there is no causal connection between Socrates' 
death and Xantippe's widowhood, the former event explains the latter. Cases like 
these clearly provide good examples of non-causal, good explanations. 
 It is this kind of determinative relation that I had in mind when I claimed 
that a naturalized theory of content should treat intentional properties in a way 
that makes them liable to follow patterns that fall under scientific explanation. 
But scientific explanation doesn't necessarily have to be causal explanation. We 
don't have to face thereby the problems involving the correct individuation of 
properties that will instantiate some nomic regularity, as most of the time there 
will not be empirical laws supporting that kind of determinative relation. 
 The main difference between a weak-reductive thesis and my position lies 
in this point about causal explanations. While a weak-reductivist is still looking 
for causal explanations in order to achieve a naturalized semantics –even if her 
approach is a functional one–, someone engaged in my safe[r] naturalistic 
enterprise would be content with Cambridge dependencies à la Kim between 
intentional and non-intentional properties. The consistency between an 
intentional and a non-intentional story that is required by any naturalistic project 
in semantics ought to be cashed out in terms of the theoretical criteria that guide 
us in dividing up the accounts that clearly are not in consonance with current 
empirical research about cognition, from those that are consonant with that 
empirical orientation. 
 Under this new specification, there does not seem to be any reason to 
think that it is in fact the case that the intentional cannot be naturalized. If there 
were, i.e., if we were to fail to achieve a naturalistic account of the intentional in 
the safe[r] sense of naturalism defended here, we would indeed bring forth the 
demons described by Fodor. It would be tantamount to giving up a place for the 
mind in the natural world, the only world we have got. So we had better keep 
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